94th Regiment of Foot
Known as The Scotch Brigade and The Connaught Rangers
- 1 Chronology
- 2 Regimental History
- 3 History in India
- 3.1 1799-1802
- 3.2 1803
- 3.3 1804-1805
- 3.4 1806-1807
- 4 Records
- 5 See also
- 6 External Links
- 7 Recommended Reading
- 8 Historical books online
- 9 References
- 1793 raised as the Scotch Brigade
- 1802 redesignated 94th (Scotch Brigade) Regiment of Foot
- 1881 amalgamated with the 88th Regiment of Foot (Connaught Rangers) becoming the 2nd Battalion, The Connaught Rangers
- 1922 disbanded on the foundation of the Irish Free State
The Connaught Rangers. (The History of the Regiment) by Lieut.-Colonel H. F. N. Jourdain and Edward Fraser. In three volumes, published 1924-28, and available at the British Library, UIN: BLL01001096428 , and also in a reprint edition.. Vol I: 1793-1922 1st Battalion, formerly 88th Foot; Vol II : 1572-1922 2nd Battalion, Formerly 94th Foot; Vol III: 1914-1919 5th & 6th Service Battalions. Officers. The Colours. Music.
History in India
|The following history of the Scots Brigade is largely extracted from The Connaught Rangers - 2nd Battalion, Formerly 94th Foot by Lieutenant-Colonel H.F.N. Jourdain, C.M.G., published in London in 1926. For the most part Cathy Day has extracted it verbatim, and occasionally added some clarifying words, or shortened very lengthy descriptions of fortresses!|
The Scotch Brigade were housed in the Toste Khana, described by Sir Arthur Wellesley as "one of the best barracks for Europeans that I have seen in India." The four companies who last landed at Madras remained there until after the taking of Seringapatam. They then rejoined Headquarters and the six companies who had gone through the Mysore campaign at Seringapatam. The now complete battalion continued in garrison at Seringapatam until October 25th when orders were received to return forthwith to the Carnatic, to the northern area of the Madras Presidency. It was reinforced by a draft of 240 rank and file from Scotland shortly before leaving Seringapatam. The Scotch Brigade proceeded to Vellore, in which fortress the Mysore princes had been interned, and there became part of the "Northern Division" of the Madras Army, recently reorganised as three Divisions : Northern, Centre, and Southern. The battalion remained in garrison at Vellore for some months, until, early in 1800, Headquarters and half the battalion moved down to Fort St George, Madras, leaving at Vellore for a short time five companies.
The half battalion at Madras were attached to Colonel Stevenson's column operating in the campaign against the Mahratta freebooter Dhoondia Wao, and took part in the final capture of Dhoondia's artillery and camp, following his defeat at Conaghul on September 10th by the co-operating column under Wellesley.
Two companies of the Scotch Brigade, in June 1801 took part in the capture and occupation of the Danish territory and fort at Tranquebar. Denmark had joined the Northern Confederacy against Great Britain, a hostile combination engineered by Russia at the end of 1800, the fate of which was decided by Nelson's victory at Copenhagen and the subsequent assassination of the Tsar Paul.
From March 1801 to May 1802 the other companies of the Scotch Brigade, split up in detachments, were in the field during the difficult and protracted jungle campaigns in Dindigul and the outlying districts in the south of the Carnatic, known as the Polygar War. The enemy were a number of semi-independent hill rajahs and military chiefs at the head of bands of irregular levies often supplied with artillery, who had revolted against the Madras Government. They resisted everywhere stubbornly and skilfully, and the storming of their hill forts proved on several occasions sanguinary work. The British columns were exposed throughout the operations to constant harassing attacks; and had usually to cut their way through almost impenetrable jungles fired on from under cover on all sides. At the close of the Polygar War, the Scotch Brigade returned to Madras and concentrated there, forming the British regiment in garrison at Fort St George.
It may be of interest to record that in 1801, while at Fort St George, Madras, the Scotch Brigade formed a Masonic Lodge - one of the "Travelling" or "Movable Military Lodges" established in the Army in India in the eighteenth century. It was granted a warrant by the Grand Lodge of England in December 1801 and was in existence as Lodge No. 1l on the Indian Register until March 1806. At that date the Provincial Masonic Authority in Madras reported to Grand Lodge the following : "The Regiment having been so long on Field Service, Lodge No. 11 has been subject to various distresses, particularly the loss of two thirds of its members amongst whom were some of its best and brightest ornaments." The Lodge was retained in the Register till 1813 and then was removed from the roll.
Numbering of the Regiment
In September 1803, the official notification arrived at Headquarters from London that the Scotch Brigade, till then without a number in the Army List, had been numbered as the 94th of the Line. The notification actually reached the battalion in the field during the Mahratta War, a few days before the Battle of Assaye was fought. The original designation of "Scotch Brigade" was at the same time to continue as an adjunct to the new number, the name of the unit appearing in the Army List thus - "94th (Scotch Brigade)."
The numbering of the regiment as the 94th, on the announcement reaching India, was a surprise and felt as a keen disappointment to all ranks. They claimed, as the officially revived Scots Brigade, to be one of the oldest, almost indeed the most senior of all, of the regiments in the British Army, on the ground that during the two and a quarter centuries they had served on the Continent, they had really only been attached to, and not incorporated in, the military establishment of Holland. They had been only "lent" to the Dutch Government by Treaty, and had at all times been liable to recall by the British Government. And on several occasions of emergency their recall had been demanded and acquiesced in. They had always worn the British red coat; had been recruited in Scotland and borne on their Colours the Cross of St. Andrew; had used at all times only the English words of command as in the British Army; had always had as their regimental call and march the ancient Scots "Duty"; their officers had been Scots by lineage and birth, who had, as a condition of their commissions, taken a special oath of allegiance to the British Crown. In the fullest sense they were entitled, they maintained, by seniority of origin and of service, to a place at or at least near the top of the list - or at any rate a special place among the oldest corps. All ranks were greatly aggrieved at finding their two hundred and thirty years of Continental service ignored and that they had been placed only as the 94th. As Royal Troops of the British Crown, furthermore, the Scots Brigade had, throughout its service in Holland, claimed and been accorded precedence over all Dutch troops; posted, on parade and on the battlefield, on the right of the line, and on the line of march, at the head of any body or column of troops that regiments of the Brigade might be attached to.
The battalion, in the Second Mahratta War, which opened in 1803, served with the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force under Colonel Stevenson. It set out for Hyderabad from Fort St George in the first week of November 1802, and joined Colonel Stevenson on the frontier in March 1803. The Scotch Brigade was the only European corps with the Hyderabad Force in the war. The Hyderabad troops joined the Madras Field Force under Major-General Wellesley on June 3rd. War with the Mahrattas had not yet been declared, but the aggressive attitude towards the British of the two principal Mahratta princes, Scindia and the Bhonsla Rajah of Berar, and their threatened invasion of the protected State of Hyderabad, left little doubt of hostilities opening at an early date. The battalion, on joining the camp at Hurryhur, the base of operations on hostilities opening, was at a strength of 1,013 of all ranks, having been brought up to that number by recent drafts from Scotland. Lieut.-Colonel Ferrier was in command. Although in broken health from the climate, he had lately rejoined from sick leave after a long illness. He was, however, shortly afterwards again forced to go on the sick list, although remaining with his men. In his place Major James Campbell took active charge of the battalion.
On August 6th news was received of the final rupture with Scindia and Wellesley was ordered to attack. Ahmednagar, attacked by Wellesley as his first objective, surrendered on August 12th, an operation that placed in Wellesley's hands a fortress overlooking the Nizam's western frontier and cut Scindia off from the southern Mahratta chiefs. The 94th and Stevenson's other battalions were occupied in marching and counter-marching along the long line they had to watch, engaged in parrying and holding up attempted Mahratta raids across the frontier. One raid only, a cavalry raid, made its way and then came to a halt, after which the first clash with the Mahrattas in which the 94th had a part took place. On that day Colonel Stevenson's force assaulted and captured Scindia's fort at Jalna, about 40 miles east of Aurungabad. Stevenson then, while Wellesley turned his attention to Scindia's Deccan army, then some 40 miles off and moving slowly, was directed to make a counter-raid north-eastward into Berar.
It was now decided that the combined forces of Wellesley and Stevenson should attack the enemy at Assaye in concert. They were to march independently, Wellesley by a route to the eastward of the intervening range of hills, and Stevenson by a route on the western side. As it happened, Wellesley, without waiting for Stevenson to join him, on hearing that the enemy were about to retreat, attacked with his own force only and routed the enemy at Assaye. A message was sent just before the combat to hasten up Colonel Stevenson, and he marched towards the sound of the guns as best he could, but, misled by his native guides while crossing the hill range, he was unable to get within eight miles of the battlefield before the action was over. Thus it was that the Scotch Brigade were unable to place "Assaye" among the list of "battle honours" on the Colours.
Burhampore and Asseerghur
Colonel Stevenson's troops, wearied out by the excessive toil from their difficulties in crossing the hill range, were unable to join Wellesley, who remained at Assaye, till the evening of September 24th. There was then a delay of twenty-four hours more before the pursuit of the enemy could begin, Stevenson's surgeons having to be lent to help in dressing the wounded of Wellesley's force, most of whom were suffering from severe cannon-shot injuries. Thus it was not until the 26th that Stevenson was in a position to take up the pursuit, Wellesley's troops being for the time unable to attempt it. Colonel Stevenson followed the retreating Mahrattas for some distance towards the river Nerbudda, picking up abandoned artillery on the way. Then, on the enemy dividing into two groups, he received orders to take possession of the fort at Burhampore and capture the important fortress of Asseerghur along which Scindia and the Bhonsla Rajah had retreated, moving westward in the hope of arranging for co-operation with Holkar. Wellesley himself remained near Ajunta, occupied with the transport of his wounded from Assaye and watching for the enemy's next move.
The fort at Burhampore, most of the guns of which had been carried off by Scindia in his retreat, was occupied with little opposition on October 19th, after a brush with some of Scindia's rearguard troops nearby. Two days later the large and powerful fort of Asseerghur was taken. Although considered the Key of the Deccan, and strongly fortified, Asseerghur fell after a few hours' bombardment, on the pettah or outer town being stormed by the flank companies of the 94th and a sepoy battalion. The Killedar, or Commandant, of the fort surrendered and was allowed to withdraw the garrison on the final summons after the breach had been reported practicable (i.e., part of the fort's walls were destroyed). Colonel Stevenson's force was then ordered to be ready to invade Berar and move against the fortress of Gawilghar. Heavy guns were being brought up and were near at hand.
Before Stevenson's force could move off, on the morning of November 29th, Wellesley's division joined, and at the same time sudden news arrived which brought about the Battle of Argaum. The Bhonsla's Berar army was reported to be camping only 10 miles off, and, on being reconnoitred early in the afternoon, appeared about to move. Wellesley had not intended to bring on an action that day. He had proposed to halt and camp until next morning as his troops had had a long march and the weather was hot. The discovery, however, on brushing aside the covering screen of Mahratta Horse, that the movements reported earlier had really meant the drawing up of the enemy in order of battle and within 5 miles, on the plain in front of the village of Argaum, entirely altered the situation. An immediate attack was decided on, although it was three o'clock in the afternoon. The enemy were drawn up, Scindia's troops on the right, the Berar troops on the left, infantry, horse and guns in masses, and extended in a general line for some 5 miles from wing to wing. They numbered upwards of 50,000, as against 10,000 or 11,000 on the British side. From fifty to eighty heavy guns were ranged along their front, with a clear field of fire over an open plain, which the attack had to cross, for upwards of 1,000 yards. The battalions of Wellesley's and Stevenson's divisions advanced first for 3 or 4 miles in three columns across cultivated ground overgrown with standing grain crops which reached breast high. Then, at the edge of the open ground, they deployed and all lay down so as to let the enemy's shot from the artillery, which opened immediately the troops came into view pass overhead harmlessly. Wellesley's division, forming the right of the line, comprised the 74th and 78th Regiment of Foot, with six sepoy battalions : Stevenson's on the left comprised the 94th Scotch Brigade and six sepoy battalions. After a short delay, caused by two of Wellesley's sepoy battalions getting into confusion by a misadventure under fire at the outset in taking up position, all were in line by half-past four o'clock. To make use of as much of the daylight as remained before sunset, the attack opened at once with a general advance, first of the cavalry with galloper guns on the wings, and then of the infantry in line with bullock-drawn field-guns in intervals.
The artillery, East India Company batteries and battalion guns, all kept firing during the advance, while the infantry "strode forward as if on parade" and in silence. The battalions, out of musketry range at first, had to hold their fire. On the enemy's side the Mahratta guns were firing their hardest; concentrating mostly on the three European battalions, the 74th and 78th Regiments and the 94th Scotch Brigade, whose Colours and the cut of their uniform marked them out from the sepoy battalions. The British moved on rapidly until within musket range. Then a few shots went off and immediately afterwards the "Charge" sounded and all raced forward. They were met all along the line by an attempted counter-charge. A picked force of Scindia's Arab contingent, known as the "Farsi Risala," in a wild swarm rushed Wellesley's wing. The massed Bhonsla Horse at the same moment galloped down on the Scotch Brigade and Stevenson's sepoys of the left wing. Both onsets were received with volleys and were everywhere beaten back. Only a comparatively few of the enemy reached the British line, where they were bayoneted, when suddenly, as the British charge pushed home, as the British line forced its way to within 60 yards, the enemy's guns fired a last discharge and immediately afterwards the whole Mahratta array buckled and broke up at all points. The enemy's horse on the wings had yielded after two weak attacks at either end of the British line, and had gone off in flight just before. The panic that set in among the infantry at seeing themselves abandoned by their mounted comrades spread along the whole long Mahratta line like wildfire and the battle of Argaum was over.
"Major-General Wellesley," says the official despatch on Argaum, "had particular satisfaction in observing the order and steadiness in which the 94th Regiment advanced to the attack." The regimental casualties in the action numbered two killed, thirty-seven wounded, two missing. One officer was mortally wounded and died within a few hours, and two other officers were wounded.
The pursuit of the fugitives by the cavalry lasted until past midnight, aided by bright moonlight. In addition to some 3,000 casualties among the overtaken enemy, the captures of artillery, camp equipage and stores, elephants and camels, were immense. Stevenson's division continued the pursuit next day, following in the track of the Mahratta infantry, some 4,000 or 6,000 of whom had made for Gawilghar fortress and joined the garrison there. Against Gawilghar operations were now at once under taken. The fortress lay between 35 and 40 miles from Argaum, as the crow flies, crowning one of the highest peaks of the Satpura range, some 4,000 feet above sea-level. It was at Ellichpur that, on the Argaum pursuit ceasing, Wellesley and Stevenson rejoined. Colonel Stevenson's division, according to the plan formed, was to take the long road round and attack the fortress from Labada on the north side, breaching the walls and carrying the place by assault. Wellesley was at the same time to approach by the shorter road on the south and demonstrate against that front of the fortress, by way of making a diversion while the main attack was in progress. Wellesley reached his position with little difficulty in less than two days. He had only light field pieces with him. It took the 94th and Stevenson's force four long days to get into position owing to the physical difficulties of their route. The heavy siege train, guns and ammunition wagons accompanied Colonel Stevenson.
The move opened with a sharp encounter with an outlying detachment of the enemy who held a small fort on high ground at Damergaum, a village at the entrance to the first of the mountain passes through which Colonel Stevenson's force had to make its way. The fort was stormed by two companies of the 94th, supported by half a battalion of sepoys. After that came the long and toilsome mountain march. "It was," wrote Wellesley in a letter to his brother, "one of the most difficult, and in the success of the execution, extraordinary operations I have ever witnessed. All the heavy ordnance and store carriages were dragged by hand by the troops over high mountains and through valleys and ravines for nearly 30 miles from Ellichpur, by roads made by themselves with a laborious exertion to which I did not think they were equal." Says Mountstuart Elphinstone in his diary:-"The guns were got forward by the soldiers and sepoys and bullocks pulling, and elephants shoving, and up steeps by putting stones under the wheels to prevent running back." Music helped, as Mountstuart Elphinstone adds, recourse being had to the "good custom of beating drums and playing the 'Grenadiers' March ' while the sepoys are dragging guns up the ghauts." To clear a road for the guns and main body, baggage, etc., a detachment of two companies of the 94th, with parties from a sepoy battalion, kept ahead of the column working incessantly night and day in reliefs with picks and shovels and felling axes.
In that way, by December 11th, the village of Labada, less than a quarter of a mile from the northern front of Gawilghar, was at length reached. A brief final skirmish, in which the light company of the 94th led, cleared the enemy outposts from Labada, and by the evening of December 12th two breaching batteries were in position on Stevenson's side. Wellesley's battery was also ready for action against the south front, and all three batteries opened fire on the 13th. Wellesley's guns were only intended to make a demonstration and divert the enemy's attention from the intended point of attack. They had to fire up the steep hill-side and could effect nothing against the thick stonework on that side. The shot, unable to make any impression, simply rebounded from the solid wall and rolled back to the very muzzles of the guns. Stevenson's heavy siege guns on the other side, firing at a short 150-yards' range, and on the level, did their work easily. The bombardment, opening on the 13th, continued all that night and all the next day, and by evening on December 14th a practicable breach had been made in the outer wall on the north side. Thereupon the order was issued for the assault to take place next day. The first party after entering the breach was to turn to the right, and the second party to the left, and drive the enemy from the ramparts, while the 94th Regiment and the 2nd Brigade were to advance and take possession of the heights and of the enemy's guns. A detail of artillery was to accompany each party, to take possession of the guns and turn them upon the enemy. Pioneers and scaling ladders were to be allotted to each party."
The assault on the north front was delivered according to plan. At the same time two columns from the 74th and 78th Regiment of Foot, with a battalion of sepoys, moved out against the southern and north-western gates of the fortress to make a feint attack and be ready to take advantage of any opportunity of intercepting the garrison that might offer. Mountstuart Elphinstone wrote:
- "The advance of the 94th was silent, deliberate and even solemn. Everybody expected the place to be well defended. As we got near we saw a number of people running on the rampart, near the breach. I was amazed they did not fire: our cannon fired over our heads. We got to the breach where we halted, and let the forlorn-hope, a sergeant's party, run up: then we followed, ran along and dashed up the second breach and huzzaed. Perhaps the enemy fired a little from some huts by the second breach: I did not see them do that. I saw some of them bayoneted there. We kept to the right after entering the second breach and soon after the troops poured in, so that there was no distinguishing forlorn-hope or anything. We huzzaed and dashed up the second breach and leaped down into the place. Such of the enemy as stood were put to the bayonet, but most of them ran off to the right and down a narrow valley which led to a gate. Here they met Colonel Chalmers coming on with half the 78th Regiment of Foot. The 94th pressed behind, firing from above and a terrible slaughter took place. After this we endeavoured to push on, when to our astonishment we discovered that we had only gained a separate hill, and that the fort lay behind a deep valley, beyond which appeared a double wall and strong gates. I thought we should have to entrench ourselves and wait till guns could be brought up to breach the inner walls. The 94th followed the road down and crowded around the gate. The first wall was joined to a steep hill and the 94th began slowly and with difficulty to climb up one by one. Beyond the first wall was a narrow rocky road, overtopped by a steep rock, and another wall and gate, over which those who climbed the first wall would have to go, which the steepness and height of the wall made impossible. While the 94th were climbing over, the enemy kept up a fire from their works: in the meantime our people poured in at the breach and covered the hill opposite to the enemy. They fired on the enemy and the valley was filled with such a roar of musketry as can hardly be conceived. The sight cannot be described. At last our men got over and opened the first gate. Scaling ladders were brought, got up the hill and applied to the second wall. The enemy fled from their works: we rushed over the wall, and the fort was ours."
Lieutenant Blakiston adds other details. Immediately after the storming of the first breach, which he says "was taken in two minutes with little resistance. A column of troops were seen to issue from the inner fort. This was immediately charged by the grenadiers of the Scotch Brigade and repulsed with great slaughter." Then, when the lower fort had been taken, "two sepoy battalions were drawn up on a height fronting the wall of the inner fort, on which they commenced such an incessant and well-directed fire that none of the enemy durst show their noses above the parapet. Under cover of this fire the light company of the Scotch Brigade placed their ladders against the wall and we were soon master of the last defences of the fort. Captain Campbell placed the first ladder and was the first man on the inner ramparts. The light company then charged forward to the gate of the inner fort, opened it and admitted the rest of the battalion and the foremost of the sepoys."
There was one final fight after that for the 94th inside Gawilghar, as Lieutenant Blakiston thus records:
- "Scarcely had the gate been opened to admit the remainder of the storming party, when a body, looking more like furies than men, having their long hair cast loose over their shoulders and brandishing their swords, came rushing from behind some buildings and fell furiously upon the 94th. These, however, received them with that coolness and determination for which undisciplined valour however desperate, can never be a match. The contest was nevertheless sanguinary to both sides, for these desperadoes sold their lives dearly. One fellow in particular, it was told, having got his back to a wall killed and wounded several Europeans before he could be despatched. Among this party was the Killedar: also the Commander-in-Chief of the Berar Rajah's infantry."
In his General Order of December 15th Wellesley, after recording that "the gallantry with which the attack was made by the detachment has never been surpassed," went on to add his "special thanks to Captain Campbell of the 94th who led the light infantry of the Scotch Brigade to the escalade of the inner fort by which the capture was finally assured." Wellesley wrote that he "had seen several places taken by storm, but never any in which so little irregularity was committed or so little plundering. In an hour after the storm," added Wellesley, "the troops marched out with as much regularity as if only passing through." The defeat at Argaum, followed by the startling surprise and storming of Gawilghar, a fortress that all India had believed to be absolutely impregnable, ended the war. It was a knock-down blow to the enemy, coming as it did, as the sequel to the rout of Scindia's northern army in November. Within two days of the capture of Gawilghar, the Bhonsla Rajah of Berar sued for peace and accepted the British terms: a fortnight later Scindia did the same.
The Indian war service of the 94th Scotch Brigade was however not yet over. Hostilities with a third Mahratta prince, Holkar of Indore, broke out early in 1804, and kept the battalion, attached throughout to the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force, in the field until March 1806. In the two principal actions of the Khandeish campaign in October 1804 - the taking of Holkar's fortresses of Chandore and Galnah, the centres of Holkar's power in Khandeish - the 94th took the leading part.
The Chandore stronghold, 85 miles west of Aurungabad, comprised a walled pettah, or outer town, and towering above it, 1,600 feet above the plain, the main fort on a steeply scarped rock with high embattled walls all round. The pettah was stormed on October 8th with little opposition by the pickets of the 94th and 74th and the fort was bombarded during the next day, to occupy the enemy's attention while a place to attempt an escalade up the rock was being searched for. A likely point was found, and at 3 a.m. on October 10th the storming party, the flank companies of the 94th, 150 of the pickets and 300 Madras sepoys, started to climb up and escalade. They reached the walls at dawn, planted their ladders silently, and taking the Mahratta garrison by surprise carried the fort at the point of the bayonet within a quarter of an hour. The 94th had one drummer and six rank and file wounded - no other casualties.
A week later, the 94th again had the main part in taking Holkar's fort at Lussulgaum by another coup de main. The capture of the strong work at Galnah took place on October 21st, the fort there being breached by artillery and taken by a surprise attack. The Mahratta commandant and garrison of 500 men surrendered after the first rush up the breach. One man killed and ten wounded were the casualties in the 94th. Major Campbell was in command of the 94th all through the campaign, with local rank as Lieut.-Colonel. He had been promoted to that rank in command of the battalion on September 27th, on which day Lieut. Colonel Ferrier died. That officer had rejoined from sick leave in the previous May, but his health again gave way, and, this time refusing to quit his dearly loved Scotch Brigade, he passed away in camp among his comrades.
Holkar's territory south of the Tapti passed into British possession with the capture of the three strongholds, and was garrisoned by the Hyderabad Force until the end of the war in March 1806. The 94th and the other battalions had at the same time to keep ready for action in case Scindia, again at the head of a large army, should attempt to come to Holkar's aid, as was constantly threatened. The principal active operations, of the war with Holkar throughout 1804 and 1805 were carried out by the Northern Army. The war with Holkar terminated the war service of the 94th Scotch Brigade in India. The battalion continued with the Hyderabad Force until March 1806. It was then sent south to Trichinopoly for a few weeks, to help keep in order the followers of a disaffected Rajah. The local restlessness however subsided, after which, on the dispersal of the Madras troops to cantonments, the 94th moved back to the Presidency and took over duty as the European corps in the garrison of Fort St George.
All ranks were in need of a rest. The numbers had dwindled through sickness to barely 300. A year before, indeed, Wellesley had reported to the Commander-in-Chief in India: "The 94th Regiment requires rest and ought to be relieved." Since 1802 it had marched to and fro in the field 984 miles. At Fort St George extra duty fell on the 94th during June and July 1806, in consequence of the agitation and unrest among the sepoys of the garrison over certain new uniform regulations by the Madras Government ordering the adoption of leather hats in place of turbans, and forbidding the wearing of beards and the display of caste marks and earrings on parade. It was these new regulations which were the prime cause in the third week of July of the mutiny at Vellore. An outbreak was prevented at Fort St George by the presence of the 94th, but excitement was rife in all the stations of the Madras Army, resulting in overt trouble at some places, in particular at Bangalore, Bellary and Wallajabad, also at Hyderabad. Severe repressive measures had to be had recourse to in the worst cases, the disbanding of a battalion at one station and the execution by blowing from a gun of the chief ringleaders at another station. The severity finally cowed the mutineers, after which the authorities cancelled the new regulations and the situation again quietened down to normal.
It was in October 1806, while the battalion was at Fort St George, that the proposal to confer the Elephant badge on the 94th was made, "representing the distinguished services of H.M. 94th Regiment and its long employment in the East and desiring that His Majesty's gracious permission should be obtained to place on the Colours and appointments the badge of an Elephant in recognition of their services in the East." The following notification appeared in The London Gazette of April 14th, 1807. "His Majesty has been graciously pleased to approve of the 94th Regiment bearing the Elephant on their Colours and on their Appointments as an honourable and lasting testimony of their distinguished Services in India."
The year 1807 saw the close of the nine years' tour of duty of the 94th in India. Orders for the battalion to prepare to return home were issued in July. The Governor-General of India expressed his "gratification at the excellent order and appearance of the troops and the promptitude and correctness with which every part of the manoeuvres was performed". Lord Minto's review was the second public function at Madras in which the 94th figured in their last year. On March 19th the battalion had been specially paraded to receive and take charge of the Colours of the Madras Fencible Corps, a ten-company volunteer regiment of city natives officered by Europeans, mostly members of the Madras Civil Service and of the white non-official community, raised in 1804 and now disbanded. The display on the occasion was in its details a notable affair, carried out before the Governor and military and civil authorities of Madras, in the presence of the entire garrison of Fort St George. The Colours were handed over to the grenadier company of the 94th with elaborate ceremonial, and as they were being marched away between the drawn-up double lines of the battalion, the band played Farewell to Lochaber and the battalion fired three funeral volleys into the air over the Colours as they passed along. The official order for the 94th to leave India was received by Major General Cradock, commanding the Madras Army, on July 16th 1807. It instructed him "to expedite the return of that corps to England, it being the next to depart according to the regulations established for His Majesty's Regiments on the Establishment of India."
Muster Roll 1804
The muster roll of H.M 94th Regiment of Foot (Scots Brigade) for 25th June 1804 to 24th Dec 1804 is available on the FIBIS database, as transcribed by Cathy Day. It recorded when the regiment was in camp near Futtypore (Fatehpur), India. On a few occasions, comments from the next muster (24th June, 1805) have been added. This is only when a soldier has died during the next muster period.
Where a man's name is followed by the words 1st or 2nd, they refer to two men having the same name, and are used to distinguish between them. The numbers were included in the original document. At this period, soldiers did not have individual, permanent regimental numbers to identify them. The numbers after the names do not necessarily indicate that the two men with the same name were related.
The original muster page contained names under the headings Present for the Whole Muster, Broken Periods from Commencement of Muster, Intermediate Broken Periods, Broken Periods to Termination of Muster and Recruits from England. Men were separated into ranks, from Privates up to Lieutenant Colonels. The database indicates which original section the soldier was listed in and adds annotations from the original muster. Note that there are several inconsistencies and errors (e.g. Wilson BROWN, Alexander LISTON). These errors were in the original document.
The codes for the original sections are:
- Officer - Commissioned and Warrant Officers
- Effective - Effective for the Whole Muster : 25th June - 24th Dec 1804
- BPC - Broken Period from Commencement of Muster
- BPT - Broken Period to Termination of Muster
- IBP - Intermediate Broken Period
- Recruit -Recruit from England - Commenced Pay 26th July, 1804 - At Poonamallee
- Connaught Rangers Mutiny in India, 1920.
- The Connaught Rangers Osprey Men-at-Arms Series
- The Connaught Rangers Wikipedia
- 94th Regiment of Foot including deployments Regiments.org, an archived site.
- The Connaught Rangers including deployments: 1st Battalion, 2nd Battalion Regiments.org, an archived site.
- "A Lost Heritage: The Connaught Rangers and Multivocal Irishness" by John Morrissey, 2005 , Chapter 3 of Ireland’s Heritages: Critical Perspectives on Memory and Identity edited by M Mc Carthy 2005. pdf Website: ARAN, National University of Ireland, Galway. Includes details of the recruitment area for the regiment, including page 5 of the pdf.
- Black Soldiers in Northamptonshire Regiments of the British Army wellingboroughrec.org.uk. William Damerun, a Eurasian enlisted at age 7 and served in the 74th Foot 24/09/1800-27/09/1805 (under age), the 94th Foot, period not noted, but under age, the 69th Foot, 25/09/1807-19/07/1824, the 48th Foot, 20/07/1824-31/07/1834, and the 55th Foot, 01/07/1834-30/11/1837 when he was discharged on medical grounds. He was a musician by trade. His brother James joined the 69th Foot 01/08/1808 as a drummer, aged 7 or 8, served in the same regiments and was discharged on medical grounds 30/11/1842
- The Royal Irish [Regiment] Details of Museums and database for the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers (27th and 108th Regiments of Foot), the Royal Irish Rifles (83rd and 86th Regiments of Foot), and the Royal Irish Fusiliers (87th and 89th Regiments of Foot). In addition, in time it is intended to include in the database the names of many soldiers who served in what have become known as the Disbanded Irish Regiments, such as the Connaught Rangers, (88th and 94th Regiments of Foot), the Dublin Fusiliers (102th and 103th Regiments of Foot) and the (18th) Royal Irish Regiment. The Leinster Regiment (100th and 109th Regiments of Foot) and the Royal Munster Fusiliers ( 101st and 104th Regiments of Foot) also are part of this category.
Alphabetical List of the Officers of the Ninety-fourth Regiment "Scotch Brigade" from 1800-1869 by Henry Stooks Smith published by Naval & Military Press Ltd (Jul 2003)
ISBN 1843424835 and ISBN 978-1843424833
Historical books online
- "Historical Record of the Services of the Ninety-Fourth Regiment", page 243 Colburn’s United Service Magazine and Naval and Military Journal 1868 Part 3 Google Books. Continues page 562. The regiment arrived In India in 1839 page 571 and remained there until 1854 page 575. They returned again in 1858 page 577 and remained until 1868 page 580
- The rifle in Cashmere : a narrative of shooting expeditions in Ladak, Cashmere, Punjaub, etc., with advice on travelling, shooting, and stalking : to which are added notes on army reform and Indian politics by Arthur Brinckman, late of HM’s 94th Regt. 1862 Google Books
- Connaught Rangers Naval & Military Press